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Abstract
In this article, virtualization security concerns in the cloud computing domain are reviewed. The focus is toward virtual
machine (VM) security where attacks and vulnerabilities such as VM escape, VM hopping, cross-VM side-channel,
VM-based rootkits (VMBRs), VM mobility, and VM remote are mentioned and discussed according to their relevance
in the clouds. For each attack we outline how they affect the security of cloud systems. Countermeasures and security
measures to detect or prevent them through techniques such as VM detection, GuardHype, VM introspection, VM
image scanning, etc. are also discussed. Through the surveyed work we present a classification of VM threats within
the clouds. Finally, we include our observations and those of other researchers on this matter of cloud virtualization
security.
Keywords: cloud computing security, virtualization security, cloud VM threat classification, VM image attacks, VM
rootkits, VM detection
1. Introduction
Many up to now would have heard about cloud computing and those with a keen sense of curiosity and belief in
this new paradigm’s capabilities would have experienced it and embarked on a journey of — dilemma at first, followed
by — excitement and hopeful possibilities. Others may have been skeptical, posing a question like this one: “how
can a mishmash of existing technologies just be hailed as a new technology?” For those with similar reservations,
cloud computing may just be a “buzz” [1, 2] surrounded by confusion with relating ideas [3, 4]. Reasons to believe
that the “cloud” [5] is nothing new, lies in its similarities to paradigms such as grid computing [6] and to some extent
with the cloud computing idea itself. John McCarthy [7], recipient of 1972 Turing award and computer scientist who
coined the term “aritifical intelligence,” in a 1961 speech foresighted a possible form of computing, as a future of
time-sharing, that may come to be delivered as a “utility” [7, 8, 9, 5]. Cloud computing brings to life such an idea.
But, there is more to it than just time-sharing and utility based computing, and the impact due to the mere existence
of such a paradigm is nothing less than far-reaching. Those who have realized this and understood what clouds really
are have relinquished their initial doubts and have come to embrace cloud computing as believers [3].
For application providers (AP) developing and deploying web applications, the cloud paradigm facilitates the use
of computing resources from public cloud providers (CP) with “multi-dimensional ease” [10]. With the ability to
allow for quick resource addition and removal, a feature which is known as elasticity [11], the cloud systems provide
a unique capability to their customers [12, 3]. Furthermore, with various service and deployment models to choose
from, such as those models mentioned in “The NIST definition of cloud computing” [11], a customer can either
hand-pick desired services from service providers or themselves setup a private cloud infrastructure for their own use.
Over the past few years, interest in cloud computing has soared, mainly due to points highlighted above. Figure 1
shows a graph obtained from Google Trends [13] on the term “cloud computing”, indicating increase in Google web
searches performed by users worldwide on the topic. Year 2007 marks the beginning of significant search requests
made to Google so as to be seen on the graph, although, cloud computing had come to be known by many since 2006
[5]. Peak searches have been performed during the first quarter of 2011, although, not as many searches have been
launched using the particular keyword since then.
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Figure 1: Trends of search term “cloud computing” by users worldwide on Google Web Search. For insufficient number of searches, data may not
be visible on the graph, which may be the case for searches before year 2007. Provided by Google Trends [13]. Retrieved on Feb 12, 2013. c©2013
Google. Google and the Google logo are registered trademarks of Google Inc., used with permission.
With growing popularity, focus has also moved toward the challenges that are being faced by cloud computing.
Security is one domain that has received a lot of concerns [14, 15]. From Google Trends [13] it has been found that
in the past 12 months, searches for terms: “cloud security” and “cloud computing security” have risen by +50% and
+40%, respectively. Many raise cloud security issues while visualizing the concerns from different perspectives such
as trust [8], authorization, multi-tenancy, access control [16], virtualization [17], etc. In this article, we focus toward
virtualization security relating to virtual machines (VMs) in the clouds. From previous publications, we consider
attacks and vulnerabilities encountered in virtual environments and describe how these attacks relate to cloud systems,
alongside discussing specific cloud virtualization threats. Furthermore, how those security issues can be dealt with
are discussed. A classification based on the surveyed works on VM threats within the clouds has also been presented.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 describes cloud computing technologies. Section 3 introduces
virtualization. Section 4 reviews virtualization security in the clouds. In Section 5, we classify the threats on VMs
in the clouds. Section 6 provides a summary of the works surveyed in this article. In Section 7, we include our
observations and those of security researchers in the area of cloud virtualization security. Finally, Section 8 presents
the conclusions.
2. Cloud computing
Cloud computing is based on technologies such as virtualization and requires a network, viz. the Internet, to
provide one or more of following services: IaaS (Infrastructure-as-a-Service), PaaS (Platform-as-a-Service) and SaaS
(Software-as-a-Service) [5]. IaaS allows customers access to CPU, storage resources and networking via virtualization
of physical hardware, in the form of VMs. VMs may be quickly allocated (and de-allocated) as needed by the
customers; this is possible through the features of elasticity and “[o]n-demand self-service” [11]. PaaS provides
customers with a functioning environment — consisting of operating system (OS) and software development kit
(SDK) — for development and deployment of software services [5]. SaaS provide end-users with access to web based
software that run on the cloud data centers. Virtualization and databases help in providing multi-tenant support, i.e.
multiple users may have access to shared resources [18].
Clouds may be deployed as a public-cloud, community-cloud, private-cloud or hybrid cloud [11]. Public-clouds
are provided by organizations such as Amazon, Google and Microsoft who host hardware and software resources in
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their facilities; although the levels of services offered may differ from one provider to another [19, 5]. Customers
pay CP as per the amount of resources used, an alternative to paying for capital expenses [20, 10]. Private clouds are
hosted by individual organizations to serve their own internal users, whereas community-clouds are hosted for users
in a group of organizations [11]. Hybrid clouds are composed as a combination of previously mentioned deployment
models [11].
3. Virtualization
Virtualization technology offers sharing of hardware for running of isolated guest OSs. A virtual machine monitor
(VMM), a.k.a. hypervisor, is positioned between the host hardware and one or more guest OSs, and manages access of
shared resources needed by the guests [21, 22, 23]. Each OS runs as a separate VM instance, which is an encapsulated
platform running on top of a hypervisor. One or more OSs execute under the control of the hypervisor, where each
OS is enclosed within its own VM, interacting with the hardware indirectly through the hypervisor [24, 25]. When
the hypervisor executes right above the physical hardware, the arrangement is known as Type-I virtual environment
[26]. If the hypervisor executes within a host OS then such an environment is known as Type-II [26].
Virtualization de-couples the physical machine from the VM and as a consequence the latter can be live-migrated
to another machine, copied as a VM image on disk to another VM image, taken snapshot of for restoration purposes
later, etc. altogether making possible various operations that allow for enhancement of non-functional attributes, e.g.
performance, fault-tolerance.
Cloud computing is build on top of virtualization, which is a “core” [17] technology of the cloud. Multiple
VMs running on shared physical resources such as CPUs, memory, networks etc. are isolated from each other due
to virtualization, thereby providing security. Key functionalities made possible through virtualization are workload
consolidation, workload isolation and workload migration [22]. These form an inherent part of the cloud operations
for delivering security, resource provisioning, power management and performance.
In cloud computing, for launching VM instances, customers (generally) use a bank of VM disk images made
available by their cloud platforms [27]; however, options may be available to create and upload custom developed
VM images to the cloud, which depends on the cloud platform being used and the support offered for custom images.
An example of publicly shared VM images is Amazon Machine Images (AMI) [28] for the Amazon EC2 cloud [29],
where images are uploaded by organizations and users (a.k.a. “Publishers” [30]). In the former, an image can be
created/published from a running VM instance by taking its snapshot [30]. Customers have various options to choose
from in the images database to obtain their desired software stack.
4. Virtualization security in clouds
Virtualization security has been a topic of discussion for a while, usually in its own context, i.e. without linking it
to cloud computing, considering the fact that virtualization existed before being one of backbones of cloud computing
(e.g. [31, 26, 32, 33]). More recently though, since the onset of cloud computing, researchers have been coupling the
two in their investigation and findings (e.g. [17, 34, 35]). Here, we discuss the security related topics from published
works. Of the works and the attacks surveyed in this article, the following are the most cloud-specific threats: “VM
hopping” [35, 17], “cross-VM side-channel attacks”[34], “VM Mobility” [17], and other VM image attacks [30].
Although, not specific to only cloud systems, “Blue Pill” [36, 37] VMBR does pose threat to cloud systems, and has
been listed as an example of “Shared Technology Issues” [38] threat by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA).
We begin our discussions with general virtualization security concerns (e.g. VM detection) and then systematically
move to various distinctive cloud related threats, those which were listed in the above paragraph.
4.1. VM detection
Virtual machines provide isolation, both in terms of inter-VM and host-to-VM isolation. This feature has really
served the purpose of security researchers, who instead of running unknown malware directly on bare hardware OS,
would run it in a VM [33]. This allows for a easy analysis of the malware, in a rather constrained environment, with
the ability to repeat the process for an even thorough analysis with reinstated VM image. However, Carpenter et al.
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[33] point out that malwares are now using VM detection intelligence and they choose their actions/behaviour accord-
ingly. One course of action by the malwares is hiding their disruptive functionality within VM environments, thereby
avoiding themselves from detection or analysis [33]. Carpenter et al. [33] mention use of host-VM communication
channel and Red Pill [39] (introduced by Joanna Rutkowska [40, 41]) as two approaches for VM detection running in
VMware.
4.2. VM escape and VM hopping in clouds
Although, malwares could detect VMs and remain dormant, there are other options for the more intelligent and
dangerous malwares: attacking vulnerabilities in the VM environment [33]. In a cloud domain, where VMs are
ubiquitous, VM detection does not have to precede an attack. “VM escape” attack [35, 42, 33] would allow an
attacker’s malware to escape the VM to the host or hypervisor on which the VM is running by exploiting vulnerabilities
in the environment. A variant would be “VM hopping” [35, 17] allowing hopping of the malware’s attacker from a
VM to another peer VM co-resident on the same host or within the control of a common hypervisor. Furthermore, VM
hopping attacks the “confidentiality, integrity and availability” [17] of the VMs, where the attacker has vast control
options once they are inside a VM. In the context of cloud computing, these attacks can have serious repercussions
where all aspects of security need enforcement.
4.3. VM detection avoidance
While detection of a VM environment (or “VME” [33]) from within a VM would benefit attackers, approaches to
circumvent detection have also been proposed. In this context, Carpenter et al. [33] use two approaches in VMware
environment by using “VMware’s undocumented features and modifying the VMware binary program . . . ” [33]. In
the former option, configuration files (VMX files) which are under the control of the VM administrator, are modified
to make changes to memory relocation and binary translation functions to achieve the VM hiding objective. The latter
method is achieved by modifying a parameter value (specifically the “VMXh” value [33]) in the VMware binary and
VM image, to the value chosen by the user which the attacker cannot then use to exploit the host-VM communication
channel vulnerability. The authors use “VMmutate”[33], a tool they have developed to achieve binary translation.
These efforts, however, lead to decrease in the following features: “drag-and-drop, cut-and-paste via the clipboard,
and shared file directories” [33].
4.4. VM rootkits and the clouds
Imagine a malware that runs undetected, lurking for a golden opportunity to spring up or just remains invisible but
watching every possible move. Ford & Allen [43, 44] in their two part article discuss about this notion of “stealth”
[43, 44]. They begin with some beneficial uses of stealth (e.g. hiding of application by vendors or for security
purposes), however, they come toward the main issue about its use by attackers. They eventually bring the discussion
toward a new class of malware: VM-based rootkits (“VMBR” [45]). The idea behind these VM-based rootkits is
taking control of an operating system running on bare hardware, by having it execute under the attacker’s hypervisor,
thereby maintaining their stealthiness [45, 37, 46, 43, 44]. Such VM rootkits became popular in the year 2006 because
of these following techniques: SubVirt [45], Blue Pill [36, 37], and Vitriol [46]. SubVirt was used in controlling of
Windows XP and Linux OS through VirtualPC and VMware VMBRs, respectively, on x86 platform [45]. Blue pill
demonstrated to “subvert” [45] the Windows Vista OS on AMD64 [37]. Vitriol targeted MacOS X on Intel Core
Duo/Solo [46]. In the following paragraphs, we focus our discussions on Blue Pill.
Blue Pill was introduced to the world by Joanna Rutkowska through her blog [36]. Interested readers may refer
to the following [36, 47] to read what she had to say about Blue Pill on the release. The novelty of Blue Pill in
comparison to the earlier VMBR, i.e. SubVirt, is that it installs without a restart and without modifying the contents
of the storage disk, thereby challenging detection [39, 37]. However, Blue Pill would fail if the system was restarted
[37]. To circumvent these problems, Rutkowska indicates that the shutdown can be intercepted by the hypervisor
to emulate a shutdown sequence of the OS, and that the hypervisor itself survives the reboot [37]. An issue which
Rutkowska mentions is the problem with nested virtualization, where an OS was already running on an hypervisor
and if Blue Pill was tried on it, then this would possibly crash the system (if nested virtualization was not supported);
therefore Blue Pill had to support nested virtualization to avoid detection by crash [37]. Well, in Rutkowska’s March
31, 2008 blog post [48], that nested hypervisor issue became a thing of the past. The announcement was support of
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nested virtualization by Blue Pill, which was complemented by a snapshot of Windows XP running inside Windows
Vista (which was itself “bluepilled”) [48].
The concept behind Blue Pill is nothing but novel, however, question is raised about it being a possible threat to
cloud computing. For this, consider a malicious action by an attacker, who installs Blue Pill on a purchased IaaS VM
to oust control from the cloud’s hypervisor, or more correctly, run through nested virtualization, and take control of
not only their own VM, but also co-resident VMs. Bradbury [49] points out with regards to Blue Pill that the “attack
could also be used to compromise an existing hypervisor” [49], suggesting such actions are possible. Furthermore,
Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), which published a list of top seven cloud computing threats, listed Blue Pill as an
example of “Shared Technology Issues” threat [38]. Note, Blue Pill does require some specialized hardware features
such as AMD’s SVM functionality to work, but support for Intel VT-x processors has also been added [50]. With the
nested hypervisor working, however, unknown threats could materialize in the future. For this, we will have to wait
for further developments in the Blue Pill concept.
4.5. VM detection – revisited
While VMBRs remain a threat, their prevention and detection are key to safeguarding systems. One general
approach is to determine if the execution is happening within a VM, where it is expected not to be. Interestingly,
Red Pill developed by Joanna Rutkowska (refer Section 4.1) itself can spot SubVirt [39]. This is possible via the
SIDT instruction (or SxDT instructions [37, 22]), which returns a “unique” [39] Interrupt Descriptor Table Register
(IDTR) address when running within a VM, different from when it is executed natively [39, 44, 22]. The reason is
that SubVirt targets x86 architecture, which does not run in full virtualization and in such case reading from privileged
registers is possible from an unprivileged level, i.e. from a software within a guest VM, thereby helping with virtual
environment detection [39, 22]. This technique, however, cannot be applied for detection of Blue Pill, which runs
in full virtualization mode [37]. In fact, this was the goal in development of Blue Pill, to hide, to be stealthy [37].
Rutkowska listed two levels of stealth [37]:
Level 1 (BPL1) Hiding when idea is known.
Level 2 (BPL2) Hiding when source code is available. BPL2 was not implemented then.
Focusing on BPL1, there are still some interesting detection options. Allen & Ford [44] refer to work done by
Garfinkel et al. [51] in this regard. Monitoring of Translation-Lookaside Buffer (TLB) hits and misses and timing
variance within VMs are good candidates [44]. Running in a VM will cause timing affects compared to a native
system, giving away existence of virtualization. With regards to timing, Rutkowska based on this has suggested
earlier of employing timing dilation implementation to avoid detection [37]. However, Garfinkel et al. [51] argue
that time dilation has overhead with affects on performance and gives higher chances of the malicious hypervisor’s
detection. Allen & Ford [44], however, bring up an important point that the mere installation of a malicious code in
the kernel is a problem and if the kernel avoids installation of unsigned driver codes then VMBR related problems
would be avoided.
For cloud computing, detection of VM to determine existence of VMBR would not work because VM is ubiquitous
in the cloud. Carbone et al. [31] suggest “GuardHype”[31] as an idea, which would allow only legitimate hypervisors
and prevent malicious VMBRs. GuardHype is based on nested virtualization, stationing itself beneath any running
hypervisior and controlling the activities, thereby guarding malicious activity by a hypervisor. Further research in this
area is needed as a solution for preventing and spotting VMBRs like Blue Pill.
4.6. VM images in clouds
Security concerns due to unintentional exposition of vulnerabilities through the use and publishing of publicly
shared VM images in the clouds by naı¨ve users (or customers) have been discussed and analyzed by Bugiel et al.
[30]. The authors use their custom developed software to analyze images and retrieve sensitive information present
within. Although, their analysis has been conducted on Amazon EC2 cloud [29], they mention that “the methods
and techniques described in [their] paper are applicable to arbitrary IaaS providers . . . ” [30]. From an attackers
cost-benefit viewpoint, they also compute the small cost of their attacks in comparison to the quite large monetary
loss that could potentially incurred by organizations because of the attacks. In their paper, mistakes such as losses
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of API keys, private keys (e.g. SSH and SSL), sensitive personal information and software source codes by means
of unintentionally including them within public VM images and thus the associated information leakage threats,
have been mentioned alongside with presentation of their analysis results from using their tool. Examples of threats
include those emanating from malicious use of user SSH private keys to login to machines that allow access to those
user credentials, or use of API keys to launch VM instances of the key owner and deploy distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks on other machines. Alongside discussing the threats from sharing of user private keys, the authors
also explain about other SSH specific threats and attacks, such as those due to inclusion of user public keys in images
that then allow for SSH backdoors and inclusion of stale SSH host keys that lead to impersonation, man-in-the-
middle attacks, etc. Furthermore, they do not restrict their discussions to unintentional causation behind creation of
VM images, but also mention about malicious intentions behind creation of VM images by citing various related
works. They mention that some actions, such as creation of SSH backdoors, inclusion of malware and introduction
of vulnerabilities within the VM images (referred as “[m]alicious VMs” [30]) may also be caused by malicious
publishers.
While highlighting VM image security issues, Bugiel et al. [30] have also suggested countermeasures against the
attacks. Through “awareness” [30] of the security issues that are aligned with handling of VM images, they intend to
educate the customers about the involved risks. Also to help the process, they examine reasons behind inadvertently
including of the keys within images (e.g. public, private keys and API keys). General countermeasure suggestions
include scanning of VM images (i.e. “VM image scanning”) by cloud providers for vulnerabilities, display of warning
to publishers about inclusion of private keys, and rating of VM images according to their “usefulness and quality”
[30].
From a cloud standpoint, these authors have highlighted the large-scale impact of security issues associated with
vulnerable and malicious VM images; these public VM images are used by many customers, who may directly use
a copy of the VM image to create VM instances or who may rely on a modified derivate of the image, where many
images and instances may exist from a parent vulnerable/malicious VM image. Furthermore, threats may also emerge
from within vulnerable or malicious live VM instances which are used to create VM images from their snapshots.
To add to the above discussion, Tsai et al. [17] dub the cloning and movement of VM images as “VM Mobility”
[17], where they mention the related attacks and vulnerabilities, and furthermore discuss about the impact on IaaS and
other layers.
4.7. Cross-VM side-channel attacks in clouds
Ristenpart et al. [34] present a compelling work highlighting vulnerabilities in VM environments due to multite-
nancy on physical machines in public clouds, and building on the information to introduce “cross-VM side-channel
attacks” [34]. The authors orchestrate the attacks on Amazon EC2 cloud [29]; however, they “believe that variants
of [their] techniques are likely to generalize to other services . . . ” [34]. The mentioned attacks include “cross-VM
keystroke monitoring” [34] and provide means of gathering confidential information. Few suggestions on how to
prevent them are provided.
4.8. VM remote attacks and clouds
Before exploiting vulnerabilities within a cloud environment and launching attacks across the cloud, an attacker
needs to gain access to a VM running within the cloud system; although at times, the eventual target may just be the
VM. In either circumstance, the attacker may use well-known remote attacks that work for any host/machine (VM
or otherwise), and McClure et al. [52] explain various ways that attackers may do just that. For remote attacks, a
“[r]emote access” [52, p. 234] to the target system is needed through a network. For Amazon EC2 clouds, VMs
have access to external network (Internet) and internal network (for inter-VM communication) through external and
internal assigned IP addresses, respectively [30, 34]; other cloud system would have similar connectivity options for
VMs such that they can be accessed and configured by the customers.
For remote attacks, one approach is finding network services that are executing on the system by scanning the net-
work ports through easily available tools (e.g. Nmap) and then exploiting well-known vulnerabilities of that particular
version of the service to enter the system [52, pp. 1–6]. After remote access, the next steps by the attacker may be
toward getting root user access and carrying out further attacks from the compromised system [52, p. 234]. Ristenpart
et al. with regards to “direct compromise” [34] from remote attacks, acknowledge that such a “threat exists for cloud
applications as well” [34].
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On a similar and related topic to remote attacks, Provos et al. [53] focus their attention on web attacks and
cyber-crimes. The shift in motivation of attackers toward monetary benefits and the attacks on web-browsers and web
servers are discussed. Discussions include: “drive-by download” [53], SQL injection attacks, .htaccess redirection
attacks, social engineering attacks, and challenges. Although the aforementioned article doesn’t mention about cloud
computing, the issues highlighted are quite relevant in the cloud domain and should not be ignored. To add, McClure
et al. [52, chap. 10] also discuss about web and related attacks along with advice to safeguard against them.
Since clouds host SaaS applications, compromise of those services and eventual gain of access inside the cloud
systems is a real threat. Furthermore, attackers who have once entered the system may employ any of the attacks
suggested above: VM escape, VM hopping, cross-VM side-channel and VMBRs, to wreck havoc in the cloud domain.
4.9. VM introspection and clouds
VM introspection is a way to keep an eye on activities relating to a VM [54]. The introspection roles may include
either simple monitoring and reporting of threats or performing actions toward mitigating those threats [54]. Other
aspects that distinguish VM introspection techniques from one another is extent of knowledge of OS running on the
VM (a.k.a. “semantic awareness” [54]) and replay of events for forensic analysis after a intrusion [54]. These tech-
niques are useful in cloud environments to analyze any attempts of an attack to the system, piece together the events
that lead to such an attack, or to trace the steps of a compromise after the fact. Anthes [9] discusses about benefits of
such techniques in the cloud, where IBM researcher Matthias Schunter points out that instead of having many virus
scanners running on each VM on a physical machine, only one “protected VM” [9] could do the introspection job.
Christodorescu et al. [55] introduces their approach of VM introspection that requires no prior knowledge of the
guest OS running on the VMs or their security state, which was lacking in the previous introspection techniques. Their
approach is useful specially in dynamic environments such as cloud computing where VM migration is common and
security of the VM has to be evaluated, and managed. The authors demonstrate two applications of their introspection
technique: i) VM OS identification, and ii) Rootkit detection and recovery. These are promising techniques monitoring
and maintaining cloud security in the future.
5. Classification: VM threats in clouds
On the basis of the survey presented in this article, a classification of VM threats in clouds has been shown in
Figure 2. These have been divided into three main categories based on the source of the threat, as follows: i) those
security concerns occurring through live VM instances, ii) those which are raised due to remote attacks on VMs, and
iii) those which are present within and propagate via publicly shared VM images.
The attacks (due to threats) instigated from VMs, may be directed toward guest VMs or their hypervisor and hosts.
Also, the threats toward guest VM could further be categorized as per the eventual target and threat type, as follows:
i) attacks on peer VMs that reside on the same physical machine (e.g. VM hopping and VM side-channel attacks),
and ii) attacks on any VMs within a cloud environment due to VMs, (e.g. DDoS attacks from VMs due to API key
leakage from VM images, other attacks from a live VM instances, or attacks caused by vulnerable/malicious live VMs
being saved in the form of a publicly shared VM images, which are later moved, copied, used and/or instantiated).
Threats due to directed remote attacks on VMs through software vulnerabilities within VM, web attacks on VM,
etc. have been discussed in Section 4.8. In addition, any general threats due to vulnerabilities within the cloud and
VM environment (known or unknown at present) would fall within this category and exploited through remote attacks.
As for threats that begin from within VM images, they may be classified based on intentionality involved in
creation of the threats, regarding which an in-depth discussion has already been presented in Section 4.6. The clas-
sification by Bugiel et al. [30] has been the main source for this (VM images) part of the categorization, which we
have shown pictorially alongside with categorization of threats from remote attacks, and live VM instance attacks.
Regarding VM image threats, these may further be pushed to threats on other VM images and instances that are based
on the originating culprit VM image.
From above discussion, hybrid threats may also emerge and the following gives an example one such instance:
i) attacker gains access to a VM through a remote attack, ii) then uses VM hopping to compromise a peer VM,
iii) followed by use of information resident within peer VM, i.e. data which was placed by the VM owner for personal
use, to then gain access to users API keys, and iv) executing of DDoS on other systems using the API keys. A related
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Figure 2: Classification of threats to VMs in clouds based on the source of the threat. Table 1 lists those works that have been surveyed in this article
and which have also been used as a guide for the classification. Of particular note, is work presented by Bugiel et al. [30], whose classification
comprising of four types of private-data loses owing to unintentional causes have been included in our classification above. Their work also
discusses about SSH attacks (malicious or otherwise).
case would be an attacker directly obtaining API keys from a VM image and executing the DDoS attacks. These
scenarios shows how “recursive VM attacks” or “nested VM attacks” may function, where one attack would enable
another, followed by more, and once compromised, a VM may remain compromised until shutdown or other event
that detects and blocks the attack, although is such latter cases confidential information is already lost to the attacker.
6. Summary of surveyed works
Table 1 provides a short summary of the publications that have been surveyed in this article and which have also
been used as a guide for the classification.
Table 1: List of virtualization security related works (in no particular
order)
Year Reference Key notes
2006 King et al. [45] Introduces SubVirt.
2006 Rutkowska [37] Presents Blue Pill [36] to subvert Windows Vista on AMD64. Lists
differences between SubVirt and Blue Pill.
2006 Zovi [46] Presents Vitriol to subvert MacOS X on Intel Core Duo/Solo
Continued on next page
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Year Reference Key notes
2007 Carpenter et al. [33] Briefly mentions the benefits of Virtualization. Discusses about VM
espace attack. Two techniques for detection of VM (in VMware)
are presented: i) through VMware communications channel (e.g.
Jerry.c tool), and ii) through Red Pill [39] tool (introduced by
Joanna Rutkowska). Authors introduce VMmutate to prevent VM
detection.
2007 Skapinetz [39] Discusses about Red Pill and Blue Pill [36].
2007 Garfinkel et al. [51] Presents VMM Detection techniques.
2007 Ford & Allen [43] Classifies stealthy mechanisms used by malware: Passive, Active.
Blue Pill and SubVirt are mentioned.
2007 Allen & Ford [44] Part-II of Ford & Allen [43]. Mechanisms to detect stealthy soft-
ware by using “cross-view diffs” [44] technique and lists software
that use uses the technique. Highlights techniques mentioned by
Garfinkel et al. [51] for detection of Hypervisors thereby attacks
such as SubVirt and Blue Pill could be circumvented.
2008 Carbone et al. [31] Discusses about VMBRs: SubVirt, Vitriol, Blue Pill. Actions by
VMBRs are termed as “hyperjacking” [31]. Proposes GuardHype
as a concept to prevent VMBR attacks by leveraging VM control
structures (VMCS) in a nested hypervisor setup.
2008 Nance et al. [54] Work concerns itself with research in virtual machine introspection
(VMI): a countermeasure technique that keeps an eye on activities
within VM.
2009 Ristenpart et al. [34] Compelling work highlighting vulnerabilities in VM environments
due to multitenancy on physical machines in public clouds, and
building on the information to introduce “cross-VM side-channel
attacks” [34]. The authors orchestrate the attacks on Amazon EC2
cloud. The mentioned attacks include “cross-VM keystroke moni-
toring” [34] and provide means of gathering confidential informa-
tion. Few suggestions on how to prevent them are provided.
2009 Christodorescu et al. [55] Introduces their approach of VM introspection that requires no prior
knowledge of the guest OS running on the VMs or their security
state, which was lacking in the previous introspection techniques.
Their approach is useful specially in dynamic environments such as
cloud computing where VM migration is common and security of
the VM has to be evaluated, and managed. The authors two applica-
tions of their introspection technique: i) VM OS identification, and
ii) Rootkit detection and recovery.
2009 Provos et al. [53] This article focuses on cyber-crimes. The shift in motivation of
attackers, attacks on web-browsers and web servers are discussed.
Discussions include: “drive-by download” [53], SQL injection at-
tacks, .htaccess redirection attacks, social engineering attacks, and
challenges. Although this article doesn’t mention about cloud com-
puting, the issues highlighted are quite relevant in the cloud domain
and should not be ignored.
2010 Jasti et al. [35] This paper focuses toward security due to cloud multitenancy. At-
tacks and vulnerabilities such as VM hopping, VM escape and VM
mobility are discussed. The authors setup a Eucalyptus cloud with
Xen hypervisor test-bed and verify if VMs are allocated fair share
of network, CPU and memory resources.
Continued on next page
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Year Reference Key notes
2010 Anthes [9] Discusses about virtual machine introspection
2010 Bradbury [49] Focuses on virtualization security issues related to cloud computing.
Blue Pill attack is discussed here.
2011 Bugiel et al. [30] A detailed study about how publicly shared VM images lead to se-
curity threats in the cloud environment, discussing how about unin-
tentional actions by naı¨ve users can cause various issues. Malicious
causes for the threats have also been mentioned along with discus-
sion of related works regarding VM image security.
2012 Tsai et al. [17] Discusses about VM hopping, VM mobility and other vulnerabil-
ities, including their impact on confidentiality, integrity and avail-
ability at different cloud service levels.
2012 McClure et al. [52] A comprehensive guide explaining from ground up about how at-
tackers compromise different types of systems by employing a vari-
ety of techniques and remote attacks and at the same time discussing
the tools that are employed to make the attacking jobs simple. For
security of users, safeguards against attacks have been discussed as
well.
7. Observations on cloud virtualization security
From the survey above, a pattern emerges as to how security in cloud virtualization has been evolving. Research
in VM detection, VM detection avoidance, advances in VMBR, followed by attempts on detection of VMBR, appear
to follow a loop, each technique trying to evade or stay on top of the other. Malwares are trying to hide from being
identified and VMs are hiding from being detected, both making an effort to dodge each other. Carpenter et al. [33]
with regards to VM detection discuss how it can develop into “a dangerous game of cat and mouse . . . ” [33]. On a
similar note, King et al. [45] while introducing the topic of VMBRs mention about a “battle . . . taking place between
attackers and defenders . . . ” [45], discussing the nature of attackers, who are trying to hide from defenders, and the
latter in turn being actively in pursuit of attackers footprints. These remarks are pretty fair assessment of the game
that is in action. Interestingly, both the attackers and defenders are motivating each other to perform their best.
On a similar note as above, security researchers are playing the role of pseudo-attackers. King et al. [45],
Rutkowska [40, 41, 36, 47], Zovi [46], Ristenpart et al. [34] and Bugiel et al. [30] have all contributed signifi-
cantly toward improving of virtualization security — thereby indirectly helping cloud security — by first highlighting
the vulnerabilities, then exploiting those vulnerabilities through novel attacks, subsequently suggesting approaches
to mitigate those attacks and providing future research directions to further improve the system security. As long as
researchers stay ahead of the real malicious attackers, cloud security is under check.
VM image based attacks demonstrate how easily vulnerabilities could be introduced and spread throughout the
cloud system, also highlighting how relevant it is to safeguard against such threats. Furthermore, they also demonstrate
how vulnerabilities still remain effective in different states of VMs — i.e. in two states: VM instance and VM image
— and remain even after transformation from one state to the other, e.g. vulnerabilities that are present in a running
VM instance would still remain a threat if VM instance is transformed and saved as a VM image. However, the threat
would be lot greater and amplified, if lot many instances were to then derive from the same vulnerable/malicious VM
image.
With regards to VMs, it can be readily realized that the barriers they provide are nothing but virtual. These barriers
may be broken and attacks such as VM escape and VM hopping clearly demonstrate such weaknesses. Measures
should be in place to enforce these barriers, such that any action to circumvent them are caught. Further advances and
research in this area is needed.
An important point to note is that although attacks such as VM escape, VM hopping, etc. remain as relevant in
private clouds as in public clouds, there appears to be a difference is the risk probability. Public clouds allow access
to customers all over the globe, whereas private clouds are restrictive to an organization, running in their local cloud
network. The malicious attacks from unknown malicious customers is not a concern in private clouds. However, the
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threat in private clouds is more focused toward insider threats [38]. An organization considering migration to the
clouds may consider other possibilities instead of just public clouds, such as private or hybrid clouds. Research into
differences between risks related to private, hybrid and public clouds and their in-depth comparison would help in this
regard.
Lastly, it is key to see clouds as an achievement and have a “positive”[56] outlook toward it. After all, cloud
computing is the realization of a foresight about sharing computing as a “utility” [7, 8, 9, 5].
8. Conclusions
In this article, virtualization security threats in the cloud computing domain were reviewed. From previous pub-
lications, we considered attacks and vulnerabilities encountered in virtual environments and described how these
attacks related to cloud systems. In addition, distinctive cloud virtualization threats were also highlighted. The fo-
cus has been on virtual machine (VM) security where attacks and vulnerabilities such as VM escape, VM hopping,
VM side-channel, VM-based rootkits (VMBRs), VM mobility, VM remote and cyber attacks were discussed. Of the
works and the attacks surveyed, the following are the most cloud-specific threats: “VM hopping” [35, 17], “cross-VM
side-channel attacks”[34], “VM Mobility” [17], and other VM image attacks [30]. Countermeasures and security
measures to detect or prevent these attacks through techniques such as VM detection, GuardHype, VM introspection,
VM image scanning, etc. were discussed. On the basis of the survey presented in this article, a classification of VM
threats in clouds was presented. Finally, we included our own views and those of other researchers on the topic.
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